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Abstract 
We study experimentally how investment decisions are affected by equally stringent but 
different policy regime treatments and how differences depend on whether decisions are made 
individually or in groups. In our experiment, subjects decide on an investment level either 
individually or jointly in groups of three. In addition, decisions are made subject to either a 
tax or performance standard treatment. We find that investments are significantly higher and 
closer to the level that maximizes revenues of the hypothetical firm in the performance 
standard treatment. This holds for both individual and group decisions, but we find no 
evidence of an interaction effect. Even though groups seem to have a knowledge advantage, 
they are not able to benefit from it, since intragroup communication is not able to transmit the 
microeconomic reasoning to group members without such knowledge. Also, groups are not 
able to attenuate the attention bias of focusing on selective information depending on the 
specific policy treatment. 
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1. Introduction 
Individuals are often confronted with complex information when they have to make 
optimization decisions. In sectors where the price structure is usually nonlinear, such as the 
electricity or water sector, it has been found that consumers base their consumption decision 
mainly on the average price rather than the marginal price (Shin 1985; Binet et al. 2014; Ito 
2014). Also, when it comes to allocating time between taxed and tax-exempt activities, many 
individual focus on the average tax rate (de Bartolome 1995). Not only is this behavior 
observed among consumers making decisions, but it is also found that firms deviate from 
profit maximization in many situations (Armstrong and Huck 2010). One explanation for such 
deviations is that managers have access to limited information or the information is too 
complex, making it difficult to examine all investment alternatives and identify the optimum. 
Instead, managers might apply simplified choice rules, relying on rules of thumb. One such 
choice rule is to choose the first investment alternative that is considered satisfactory rather 
than compare all investment alternatives. Simon (1955) and Cyert and March (1963) refer to 
such a choice rule under bounded rationality as “satisficing.” 
In a recent artefactual experiment, Hennlock et al. (2017) tested how high-level 
industry managers and senior advisors made an investment decision under different 
environmental policy regimes. The authors found that managers in many cases applied choice 
rules that conflict with standard economic theory. Similar to the findings by Shin (1985), 
Binet et al. (2014), and Ito (2014), the prevalent choices decision-makers made in the 
experiment were consistent with minimizing the average cost of abatement in the treatments 
based on price instruments (tax and subsidy treatment). In a performance standard treatment, 
however, the choices were, on average, closer to the optimizing behavior prescribed by 
standard economic theory. 
The question that we address in this paper is whether joint decision-making by a group 
of individuals can enhance investment decisions like the one presented in Hennlock et al. 
(2017). More specifically, we are interested in analyzing whether groups are better than 
individuals at taking into account the importance of marginal costs and, as a consequence, are 
more likely to apply choice rules that are in line with standard economic theory when 
information is limited. 
Group decision-making is a common arrangement for overcoming informational 
limitations and may ameliorate any effects of bounded rationality observed at the level of the 
individual decision-maker (e.g., Fahr and Irlenbusch 2011). The literature on group decision-
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making in economics suggests that decisions can be considerably improved when made by a 
group rather than individually (for an overview, see Charness and Sutter 2012). In contrast, 
the literature in psychology on individual versus group decision-making focuses more on the 
properties of the decision task to explain when individuals may or may not perform better 
than groups. The main distinction is made between intellective and judgmental tasks 
(Laughlin and Ellis 1986; see section 2.4 for further discussion). An intellective task has an 
objectively correct solution, whereas a judgmental task does not. Moreover, for intellective 
tasks, the degree of demonstrability is an important characteristic. If an individual is able to 
demonstrate to others the superiority of one possible solution over the alternatives, it has been 
shown that groups perform better than individuals at making such decisions (e.g., Laughlin et 
al. 2002; Maciejovsky and Budescu 2007). 
In this paper, we explore group versus individual decision-making in a setting where 
decisions can arguably be characterized as intellective tasks, but where there are limits to the 
demonstrability. This setting is relevant especially in situations where decisions need to be 
made based on limited information, which is true in many real-world situations. To test 
whether choice rules differ between individuals and groups, we extend the design of 
Hennlock et al. (2017). We use two of their treatments, the tax and performance standard 
treatments, and analyze in a between-subject design whether investment decisions made by 
groups of three differ from those of individual decision-makers.  
Our experiment was conducted with undergraduate students at the School of Business, 
Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg. In the first part of the experiment, 
students solved a task asking them to maximize revenue of a firm by choosing an investment 
level, either individually or in groups of three. As a basis for the investment decision, a set of 
information parameters (on marginal cost, average cost, and performance level) was provided 
in the decision task. In the second part, all students provided individual answers to a survey.  
We find significant differences in investment decisions between the tax and 
performance treatments. Subjects invested significantly more in the performance treatment 
than in the tax treatment. This is partly explained by differences in subjects’ stated level of 
attention to information variables in the decision task. In the tax treatment, subjects reported 
paying more attention to cost-related variables, while in the performance standard treatment, 
subjects relied more on information about the performance of the investment level. These 
results therefore replicate the findings of Hennlock et al. (2017). Furthermore, the 
performance of groups did not differ significantly from that of individuals, either in the 
performance standard or in the tax treatment. Even though we find that knowledge about 
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microeconomic foundations significantly increases the probability of applying the choice rule 
prescribed by standard economic theory, the groups were not able to benefit more than 
individuals from this knowledge advantage. This suggests that communicating the economic 
reasoning within groups in which at least one group member has knowledge about the choice 
rule as prescribed by standard economic theory fails to improve decision-making. Also, we 
find no evidence that groups are able to attenuate the attention bias of focusing on selective 
information based on the policy instrument.  
The paper is organized as follows. The experimental design and procedures are 
described in section 2. The results are presented in section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Survey Design and Experimental Manipulations 
2.1. Population, participants, and execution of the experiment 
The experiment was conducted January 18–21, 2016, at the School of Business, Economics 
and Law at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. This was the first week of the spring 
semester, and the dates were carefully chosen to both facilitate the execution of the 
experiment and maximize the number of participants. The director of studies and student 
administrators provide general information to all classes in economics and statistics during the 
first lecture each semester, and we enlisted the director of studies to invite the students to 
participate in the experiment. 
The invitation to participate in the experiment was framed as follows: At the end of the 
information session, the director of studies told the students about the possibility of being part 
of a panel that voluntary participates in experiments conducted by economics and finance 
researchers at the school. Further, the students would have an opportunity to participate in a 
classic pen-and-paper experiment that would end the information session. The students were 
informed that participants could earn between 40 and 100 Swedish kronor (approximately 
US$4.70–11.70), depending on performance. On average, students earned 82 Swedish kronor 
(about US$9.50). The payment was made via the Swedish finance technology app Swish, 
transferring the money between bank accounts using only the students’ cell phone numbers, 
or alternatively over the counter a few days later at the student administration office. 
Approximately 90 percent of students chose to have the payment transferred to them using 
Swish.  
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While participation was voluntary, all students were asked to stay in their seats throughout the 
pen-and-paper experiment even if they chose not to participate. Altogether, students enrolled 
in five different undergraduate courses were invited to participate in the experiment 
conducted at the end of the first lecture hour of each class: one class in basic economics, one 
class taking economics courses as electives, one class in intermediate economics, one class 
attending a specialization course in economics (econometrics at the bachelor’s level), and one 
basic statistics class. By choosing economics students for the experiment, we wanted to 
guarantee that a share of students had taken basic microeconomic courses and were familiar 
with solving optimization tasks. The registered number of students in these courses was 862, 
but fewer students attended the lectures.1 In total, 578 students participated in the experiment. 
Eight observations were dropped, leaving a total of 570 observations.2 
The experiment was divided into two parts. In the first part, working either individually or in 
teams of three, participants solved the decision task to maximize the net return of a 
hypothetical firm by choosing an investment level subject to either a tax or performance 
standard treatment (explained in detail in sections 2.2 and 2.3). In the second part, all 
participants answered a survey individually. The experiment lasted for 30 to 40 minutes, and 
all participants were monitored by the researchers and four to six research assistants (the 
number of assistants varied depending on class size). See section A.2.2 in the appendix for the 
full survey. 
 
2.2. Treatments 
After the invitation to participate in the experiment, the research assistants handed out 
envelopes. Students who chose to participate either shared an envelope in a group of three or 
received an envelope individually. In the envelopes that were distributed was an instruction 
page and additional envelopes for part one and two of the experiment. All students were 
instructed to leave the envelopes closed until further notice. After each participating student 
or group had received an envelope, the director of studies told the students to open the 
                                                          
1 The main reason for not attending the information session was that it was not mandatory. Especially for 
students who were enrolled in a course to retake an exam, the information session did not provide much new 
information. 
2 The observations were dropped because the student did not answer the main question (1 observation), students 
were talking to their neighbors (4 observations), or one of the group members left the room (3 observations). 
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envelope and take out the instruction page (in yellow for ease of reference). The instructions 
were read out loud to the class (see section A.2.1 in the appendix for details). 
Then the participants took out the envelope for part one of the experiment (in white) and 
started to solve the task: to choose which of six investment alternatives would yield the 
highest net revenue for a hypothetical firm (further described in section 2.3). The students 
were asked to talk quietly within the groups (figure A.1 in the appendix is a photo from one of 
the sessions). We did not observe any communication between groups or individuals during 
the sessions (other than in the dropped observations noted above), and the same protocol was 
followed strictly for each session. Of the 570 students who completed the experiment, 414 
were assigned to groups (yielding 138 group responses) and 156 to the individual treatments. 
The two treatments differed only in the instructions about the regulatory information shown in 
table 1. This design ensures that the stringency of the two policy instruments is identical. 
Table 1. Policy instrument treatments 
Treatment Regulator’s information 
Performance standard The condition for your investment decision is that the firm should meet an 
emissions limit of 75 grams per kWh output on an annual average basis 
according to the Swedish Environmental Code. 
Tax The condition for your investment decision is that the firm will pay an 
emissions tax of SEK 250 per kg of emissions each year. 
Note: kWh = kilowatt hours; SEK = Swedish crowns; kg = kilograms  
The assignment of groups and individuals to the two treatments was done in a semirandom 
way by successively assigning the four possible conditions.3 To form groups of three, students 
sitting next to each other were asked to work together during the experiment. The main reason 
for not assigning treatment randomly and reshuffling students to groups was that changing the 
seating in the lecture halls would have been too time-consuming and probably would have led 
to a high dropout rate. Because groups were not assigned randomly and might differ with 
respect to how well group members knew each other beforehand, we asked for this 
information explicitly in the ex post survey.  
Of the 570 students who completed the experiment, 283 were assigned to the tax treatment 
and 287 to the performance standard treatment. Table 2 reports the number of groups and 
individual subjects (by course/session and decision treatment, tax versus performance 
                                                          
3 Treatment tax and individual; treatment tax and group; treatment performance standard and individual; 
treatment performance standard and group.  
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standard). Two-sided tests of pairwise comparison of all possible combinations of the four 
treatments does not yield significant differences in the characteristics and study programs at a 
5 percent significance level.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Description All 
students 
(n = 570) 
Tax 
treatment: 
individual 
(n = 76) 
Tax 
treatment: 
group 
 (n = 207) 
Performance 
standard:  
individual 
(n = 80) 
Performance 
standard: group 
(n = 207) 
Background characteristics (shares) 
 
Female =1 if the 
student is 
female 
 
0.45 0.37 0.48 0.39 0.48 
Age Age in years 
(min 19, max 
71) 
 
23.7 23.9 23.7 24.3 23.3 
Microeconomics 
 
=1 if course 
taken 
 
0.37 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.35 
Study program (number of students) 
       
Basic economics 
 
 188 22 72 25 69 
Elective courses in 
economics 
 
 141 21 45 21 54 
Intermediate 
economics 
 
 100 12 39 13 36 
Specialization 
courses in 
economics 
 
 64 12 21 10 21 
Basic statistics  77 9 30 11 27 
   
Note: Two-sided t-tests of pairwise comparison of all four treatments do not yield significant differences in the 
background characteristics and in the study program chosen, at a significance level of 5%.  
2.3. The decision task and incentives 
As in Hennlock et al. (2017), the decision task to maximize the net return of a firm was 
presented to the students as a choice among six different investment alternatives. For each 
investment alternative, three different categories of information were provided: 
1. regulatory information about the stringency and type of policy instrument in place 
(varies across treatments; see table 1, tax versus performance standard); 
2. emissions performance levels in grams of emissions per kilowatt hours (g/kWh) of 
output for each of the six investment alternatives (identical across treatments); and 
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3. total, average, and marginal costs of the six investment alternatives (identical across 
treatments). 
The investment alternatives were presented to the subjects in the form of a choice set 
containing information categories 2 and 3 (see table 3). The choice set contained six different 
investment (abatement) levels, A through F, with varying emissions performance and 
abatement costs. The columns show investment alternatives A–F, and the rows provide 
information about outcomes in terms of the emissions performance and costs associated with 
each alternative.4 Since groups were allowed to quietly discuss the investment decision, there 
was a small risk that individuals seated next to a group would overhear the group’s decision. 
To prevent such incidents from biasing our results, the letters of the investment alternatives 
were not identical between versions.5  
The investment alternatives in table 3 were designed in such a way that the information 
attributes had their minimum values at different alternatives, except for the total annual 
investment cost and the marginal cost, which were both minimized for alternative A. The 
value for the emissions performance was lowest for alternative F and the average cost of 
abatement for alternative D. Also, the information provided to participants made it impossible 
by design to find the investment alternative with the highest net return numerically. Rather, 
subjects had to rely on choice rules that are described in more detail in section 2.4. 
Table 3. Choice set with information variables in all treatments (information categories 2 and 3) 
 Alt A Alt B Alt C Alt D Alt E Alt F 
Emissions performance (g/kWh) 95 90 85 80 75 70 
Total annual investment cost 
(SEK) 
21,250 25,000 31,250 40,000 51,250 65,000 
Marginal cost of abatement 
(SEK/kg) 
50 100 150 200 250 300 
Average cost of abatement 
(SEK/kg) 
430 250 210 200 210 220 
  
                                                          
4 The minimum average cost, where marginal cost equals average cost, is found in alternative D. The production 
volume is assumed to be constant across A–F, implying that cost minimization will also maximize net revenue.  
5 Students were informed that the versions were not identical. For groups and individuals and within each 
treatment, there were four sets of letters for the investment alternatives, with the values A–F, D–I, G–L, and J–O. 
The different alternatives were given out sequentially to guarantee that subjects sitting next to each other had 
different letters assigned to the investment alternatives. 
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The underlying cost function for table 3, which was not known to the experiment participants, 
is given by the following equation: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇(𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇) = 20,000𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + (𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇2)𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆/2.  
Without any abatement, 1,000 units of emissions are assumed to be produced. Investment 
alternative A abates 50 units and emissions are 950. The investment alternatives increase the 
abatement level by 50 consecutively, so that at alternative F, abatement is 300 and emissions 
are 700. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the underlying continuous cost function with each 
investment alternative depicted in the graph. Alternative A has the lowest investment cost, but 
under the performance standard, alternative E has the lowest cost that complies with the 
emissions limit. For the environmental tax, not only the annual investment cost has to be 
considered, but also the tax that has to be paid for each unit of emissions that is not abated. 
Figure 2 depicts the sum of these costs for each investment alternatives, and as can be seen, 
alternative E has the lowest total cost when the environmental tax is applied. Thus, the 
optimal investment choice is the same in the performance standard and the tax treatment.  
Figure 1. Total annual investment cost for each investment alternative (not shown in the experiment) 
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Figure 2. Total cost for each investment alternative in the tax treatment (not shown in the experiment) 
 
Immediately after making the investment choice, subjects were asked to grade, on a six-item 
Likert scale, how relevant each information attribute was for their choice.  
The participants were informed that their payoff would be determined by their performance—
that is, the higher the corresponding net return from the investment (as given by the 
underlying cost function), the higher the payoff to the individual or group. The investment 
alternatives gave the following payoffs: alternative E yielded a payoff of 100 SEK, D or F 
yielded 80 SEK, C yielded 70 SEK, B yielded 60 SEK, and A yielded 40 SEK. For those in a 
group, each member received the full payoff for the alternative the group chose. 
 
2.4. Definition of the task  
Economic experiments of group decision-making have mainly focused on error rates when 
evaluating probabilities.6 Researchers have studied variations of the conjunction fallacy 
experiment, first introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). The setting in these tasks is 
chosen in such a way that the correct solution can be easily calculated by applying logical 
reasoning but is in contrast to the intuitive heuristics many people base their decisions on. It is 
                                                          
6 A variety of group experiments in economics have been conducted in interactive settings, such as beauty 
contest or market entry games (see, for instance, Cooper and Kagel 2005; Kocher and Sutter 2005; Kugler et al. 
2012). In this class of experiments, the task is mainly to update beliefs about the behavior of the other players’ 
actions correctly, so the tasks are quite different from those in our setting and therefore are not discussed here in 
detail. 
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found that groups are systematically better in identifying the correct solution in such cases 
(Charness et al. 2007, 2010).  
The psychology literature makes a distinction between intellective and judgmental tasks. An 
intellective task is defined by having a correct solution, such as a mathematical optimization 
problem. In contrast, a judgmental task lacks such a correct answer, and the solution might 
depend on individuals’ preferences and beliefs. If a task is intellective, it can be further 
defined by the extent to which the correct solution is demonstrable to other group members 
(Laughlin 1980). The degree of demonstrability of a task depends on four characteristics: 
First, group members must have a common conceptual system (for example, a mathematical 
or verbal system). Second, they must have sufficient information to solve the problem. Third, 
group members must be able to understand the reasoning of the person knowing the answer. 
And fourth, the person knowing the correct answer must be able to explain the correct 
solution to the other group members (Laughlin and Ellis 1986). The higher the degree of 
demonstrability, the better the performance of groups should be compared with individuals in 
solving a task. Given that at least one group member knows the correct solution, it should be 
easier to convince the other group members of the solution the higher the demonstrability of 
the task. Empirical evidence in psychology has shown that groups have an advantage over 
individuals when solving tasks with a high degree of demonstrability (Laughlin et al. 2002; 
Maciejovsky and Budescu 2007).  
In line with the description above, we characterize the tasks in both the tax and performance 
standard treatment as intellective, since in theory each has a correct and unique cost-
minimizing solution. However, based on the information provided in the treatments, this 
solution is not numerically verifiable by participants in the experiment. Instead, the task has to 
be solved using a simplified choice rule. Based on economic theory, the choice rule that 
maximizes the net revenue for the firm in the case of the performance standard is the one that 
does not exceed the emissions limit and has the lowest total cost of abatement among the 
remaining options. In the tax treatment, the choice rule maximizing the net revenue for the 
firm corresponding to standard economic theory is to set the marginal cost of abatement equal 
to the emissions tax rate. Given the information provided, it is also possible to apply choice 
rules that do not necessarily maximize the net revenue for the firm. An overview of possible 
choice rules is given in table 4. Independent of the treatment, subjects might base their 
decision on minimizing a specific cost variable, which would lead to different investment 
alternatives as summarized under “General choice rules” in table 4. There also exist 
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treatment-specific choice rules, such as choosing the investment alternative where the tax 
equals the average cost of abatement in the tax treatment. In the performance standard 
treatment, minimizing any of the cost variables conditional on not exceeding the emissions 
limit will lead to the same investment alternative choice.  
Table 4. Possible choice rules when choosing an investment alternative 
Possible choice rules Investment 
alternative 
General choice rules  
Minimize emissions performance F 
Minimize total annual investment cost A 
Minimize marginal cost of abatement A 
Minimize average cost of abatement D 
Choice rules in the performance standard treatment 
Minimize total annual investment cost/marginal cost of abatement/average cost of 
abatement given that the emissions limit is not exceeded 
E 
 
Choice rules in the tax treatment 
Tax equal to marginal cost of abatement E 
Tax equal to average cost of abatement B 
 
The extent to which the choice rules that maximize the net revenue for the firm are 
demonstrable to other group members varies broadly between the two treatments. In the 
performance standard treatment, the information provided to participants states that the 
emissions should not exceed 75 grams per kWh output. Looking at the information variables 
given for the investment alternatives, it should be relatively easy to identify that the emissions 
performance from investment alternatives A to D exceeds the allowed emissions and therefore 
should not be taken into account. This reasoning should also be easy to demonstrate to other 
group members, since one just has to point at the row with the emissions performance of the 
different investment alternatives. As a second step, groups have to decide between 
alternatives E and F. The optimization rule here is to take the investment alternative with the 
lowest total annual investment cost (E). If all group members have sufficient knowledge of 
microeconomic foundations to understand this reasoning, it should be relatively easy for one 
group member to explain which alternative to choose and convince the other group members. 
Without the knowledge, the demonstrability of the choice rule is lower, but the alternatives to 
choose from should at least be narrowed down to two out of the six investment alternatives (E 
and F, which comply with the performance standard), as summarized in table 4.  
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In the tax treatment, the degree of demonstrability of the revenue-maximizing alternative 
depends on the knowledge of the optimality condition that the marginal cost of abatement 
should be equal to the tax rate in order to minimize costs. If at least one group member has 
this knowledge and is able to explain the reasoning to the other group members, the degree of 
demonstrability is relatively high. If none of the group members has this knowledge, it is hard 
or even impossible to demonstrate the choice rule to other group members. 
Hence, we argue that the demonstrability is in general higher in the performance standard than 
in the tax treatment. However, this does not necessarily mean that groups are more likely than 
individuals to choose the investment level that is in line with the net revenue-maximizing 
choice rule under the performance standard. If finding the net revenue-maximizing choice rule 
is relatively simple for individuals under the performance standard such that most are able to 
identify it, there may not be an advantage for group members to demonstrate this choice rule 
to each other. Therefore, we hypothesize that groups will perform at least equally well as 
individuals in the performance standard treatment.  
In the tax treatment, we expect that the demonstrability within groups is relatively high if (i) 
groups have at least one member with knowledge of the optimality condition, (ii) the group 
member with the information is able to explain the reasoning to the other members, and (iii) 
the other members are able to follow the reasoning of the knowledgeable group member. We 
hypothesize that groups will be more successful than individuals in identifying the revenue-
maximizing choice rule (in accordance with standard economic theory) given that conditions 
(i)–(iii) are fulfilled in the tax treatment.  
3. Results 
3.1. Treatment effects 
We start by analyzing differences between the tax treatment and the performance standard 
treatment. Summary statistics of the investment alternatives chosen are shown in table 5 and 
figure 3. Comparing differences in the distribution between the two policy treatments (and 
aggregating decisions made by groups and individuals), we find that investment levels are 
significantly lower in the tax treatment compared with the performance standard (p < 0.01, 
Mann-Whitney test). This result holds when the difference between the tax and the 
performance standard is compared within the individual treatments and within the group 
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treatments.7 Furthermore, in the tax treatment, choices appear slightly more evenly distributed 
across alternatives compared with the performance treatment, where alternative E is the most 
frequent choice. This holds in both the individual and the group treatments.  
In the performance standard treatment, the most frequently chosen alternative is E; 59 percent 
(individual) and 49 percent (groups) chose this alternative. This alternative has the lowest 
total annual investment cost between the two alternatives that comply with the standard. In the 
tax treatment, only 11 percent of individuals and 4 percent of groups chose investment 
alternative E. The most commonly chosen alternative in the tax treatment was instead 
alternative D (44 percent of individuals and 49 percent of groups), consistent with a choice 
rule of minimizing average cost in the task. Hence, the results comparing policy treatments 
are overall consistent with the results found in Hennlock et al. (2017). Our results are also in 
line with the findings of Shin (1985), Binet et al. (2014), and Ito (2014). These studies find 
that individuals, when faced with a complex decision situation, tend to base their consumption 
decision mainly on average price rather than marginal price.  
Table 5. Summary statistics of investment decision: the percentage of subjects choosing the different 
investment alternatives in each treatment 
       
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Tax       
Individual 0.02 0.17 0.21 0.44 0.11 0.04 
Group 0.01 0.06 0.38 0.49 0.04 0.01 
Performance standard       
Individual  0.03 0.01 0.11 0.21 0.59 0.05 
Group 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.25 0.49 0.04 
Note: The cells highlighted in gray show the modal response in the particular treatment. 
Figure 3. Investment choice by treatment 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 p < 0.01 for Mann-Whitney tests in both subsamples. 
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A comparison between individual and group treatments shows that the distribution of 
frequencies in the tax treatment seems to be more dispersed in the individual treatment than in 
the group treatment, in which alternatives C and D have relatively larger frequencies. A 
Mann-Whitney test, however, does not detect any significant difference between the 
individual and group treatments (p = 0.7487). In the performance treatment, the differences 
are less clear, and again a Mann-Whitney test does not yield any significant difference (p = 
0.1940). 
To test whether the treatments can provide an explanation for observed investment choices, 
we use a multinomial logit model with the investment choice as the dependent variable and 
the treatments as independent dummy variables. The marginal effects are discrete changes 
compared with the baseline level (individual decisions in the performance standard 
treatment). Table 6 contains the predicted probabilities and marginal effects of the 
multinomial logit model.  
Table 6. Predicted probabilities and average marginal effects on choice in the multinomial logit model 
Multinomial logit model       
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Tax -0.000 0.208*** 0.072 0.166** -0.430*** -0.014 
 (0.018) (0.080) (0.067) (0.083) (0.067) (0.026) 
Group -0.251*** 0.152* 0.074 0.085 -0.054 -0.006 
 (0.011) (0.084) (0.047) (0.069) (0.046) (0.022) 
TaxXGroup 0.221** -0.236** 0.112 0.047 -0.123 -0.022 
 (0.106) (0.094) (0.100) (0.127) (0.128) (0.050) 
Predicted average 0.017** 0.078*** 0.204*** 0.350*** 0.313*** 0.037*** 
Probability (0.008) (0.015) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.011) 
Prob > chi2   0.000       
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
The differences in choices between groups and individuals are indicated by the “Group” 
dummy variable in the regression. Here, groups are significantly less likely than individuals to 
choose alternative A, while they are more likely to choose B. However, there is no difference 
between groups and individuals in choosing the cost-minimizing alternative E. Also in the tax 
treatment, there is no significant difference in choosing alternative E between groups and 
individuals (see coefficients for “TaxXGroup”). In contrast to the performance standard, the 
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choices between alternatives A and B are reversed: groups are significantly more likely than 
individuals to choose A, while they are less likely to choose B. 
3.1. Investment choice and background knowledge 
In the questionnaire following the experiment, we asked all subjects for the optimality 
condition for a firm to maximize its net revenue in response to an environmental tax 
according to standard economic theory. Out of four possible answers, only one was correct. 
The question was number 6 in the survey, so we refer to it as “Q6” in the following 
discussion. The exact wording can be found in section A.2.3 in the appendix.  
We assume that individuals who answer this question correctly are more likely to choose 
alternative E, which is in line with the revenue-maximizing choice rule. Table 7 gives an 
overview of how the participants answered Q6. As can be seen in the first two columns, in the 
tax treatment, 54 percent of groups had at least one member that answered the question 
correctly, whereas only 29 percent of individuals chose the correct answer.8 These numbers 
are close to the percentages we would expect if individuals would randomize over alternatives 
in Q6.  Choosing one of the four alternatives in Q6 at random, we would expect that 58 
percent (= 1 – 0.753) of groups have at least one member that chooses the correct answer and 
25 percent of individuals answer correctly. However, individuals who have taken the basic 
microeconomic course before participating in the experiment were more likely to answer 
question 6 correctly (see table A.1 in the appendix). If the answers were completely random, 
we would not expect to see a correlation between the two variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 For the performance standard, the answers to Q6 were similar, as shown in the lower part of table 7. Since it 
is of little importance to know the optimality condition to identify the cost-minimizing investment alternative E 
under a performance standard, we do not discuss this case further.  
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Table 7. Summary statistics of the correct answer to question 6 
 Share of answers to 
question 6  
(number of observations in 
parentheses) 
Frequency of number of group members 
answering question 6 correctly 
(number of observations in parentheses) 
Total number of 
observations 
 Incorrect Correct* 1 2 3  
Tax       
Individual 0.71 0.29     
 (54) (22)    (76) 
Group 0.46 0.54 0.39 0.10 0.04  
 (32) (35) (27) (7) (1) (67) 
Performance standard  
Individual  0.83 0.18     
 (66) (14)    (74) 
Group 0.54 0.46 0.36 0.09 0.01  
 (37) (32) (25) (6) (1) (69) 
* Group observations were counted as answering the question correctly if at least one group member answered 
the questions correctly. 
 
Further, if answers to Q6 were completely random, we would not expect that it has a 
significant influence on choosing the cost-minimizing investment alternative, either. Table 8 
shows results for a multinomial logit model where the answer to Q6 is the regressor and the 
different investment alternatives serve as dependent variables. The table depicts estimates for 
average marginal effects, and predicted probabilities are shown for the tax treatment. The 
upper part, sample A, includes only the observations of the tax treatment for individuals. 
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Table 8. Predicted probabilities and average marginal effects on choice in the multinomial logit model: 
within-treatment difference for the tax treatment 
Multinomial logit model       
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Sample A: Tax treatment, individuals 
Q6 correct (dummy) –0.348 0.022 –0.018 0.124 0.198*** 0.021 
 (0.252) (0.097) (0.116) (0.164) (0.069) (0.040) 
Predicted average 0.026 0.171*** 0.211*** 0.447*** 0.105*** 0.040* 
Probability (0.018) (0.043) (0.047) (0.057) (0.033) (0.023) 
Prob > chi2  0.000       
Observations 76 76 76 76 76 76 
Sample B: Tax treatment, groups 
Q6 correct (index) –0.591 –0.068 0.194 0.305 0.137 0.022 
 (0.610) (0.113) (0.300) (0.366) (0.089) (0.024) 
Predicted average 0.015 0.044* 0.377*** 0.507*** 0.044* 0.015 
Probability (0.014) (0.025) (0.058) (0.060) (0.023) (0.015) 
Prob > chi2   0.000       
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
For individuals, knowing the correct answer to Q6 increases the likelihood of choosing the 
cost-minimizing alternative E by about 20 percent. Given the results, we can assume that the 
answers to Q6 were not completely random, or otherwise the answer to the question should 
not have had an effect on choosing the cost-minimizing investment alternative. Further, the 
results indicate that individuals are able to apply theoretical microeconomic knowledge to the 
specific task in the experiment. Hence, having knowledge of the microeconomic foundation 
seems to be sufficient to identify the cost-minimizing investment alternative, at least for a 
considerable share of the individuals. Therefore, we can assume that the second condition for 
a task to be demonstrable (namely, to have sufficient knowledge to solve a task) is fulfilled in 
the tax treatment for individuals answering Q6 correctly. 
The regression results for groups are depicted in sample B in table 8. Here, the explanatory 
variable for answering Q6 is not a binary dummy, but rather an index indicating the share of 
group members answering Q6 correctly (taking the value 0, ⅓, ⅔, or 1). Since the scaling of 
the explanatory variable differs between samples A and B, the size of the coefficients cannot 
be compared directly. In column 5, the coefficient for having group members who answered 
Q6 correctly shows no significant influence on choosing investment alternative E.  
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To learn more about the group decision-making process, we analyze the role members had in 
the group discussion. In the ex post survey, we asked all group members to evaluate how they 
perceived the other members’ influence during the discussion. This gives us two independent 
observations on each group member, which we aggregate to an average index of the two 
evaluations. The evaluation consisted of three statements: (i) “Member X had influence on 
our collective group decision”; (ii) “Member X had a leading role in the group”; and (iii) “The 
group decision coincided with member X’s personal opinion.” Each of these statements was 
rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“Do not agree at all”) to 4 (“Agree fully”). Especially 
in the group tax treatment, group members who knew the optimality condition (and answered 
Q6 correctly) might have been seen as experts and could have taken a leading role in the 
discussion.  
In table 9, we therefore focus on individuals in the TaxXGroup treatment and analyze to what 
extent knowledge about the optimality condition can serve as an explanatory variable for the 
role a group member had during the discussion. As the regression results suggest, 
knowledgeable group members did not have significantly more influence on the group 
decision (column 1), nor did they take a leading role within the group (column 2). If 
knowledgeable group members tried to explain the choice rule to set marginal costs equal to 
the tax rate to other group members but failed, we would expect to see that knowledgeable 
group members did not agree to the investment level chosen by the group. However, we do 
not see that knowledgeable group members are significantly more likely to disagree with the 
decision taken. 
Table 9. Effect of answering Q6 correctly on perception of other group members regarding the role of the 
individual during the discussion (tax group treatment only) 
OLS Model    
Evaluation of  
group 
members 
Member X had influence 
on  
our collective group 
decision 
Member X had a 
leading  
role in the group 
The group decision coincided 
with  
member X’s personal opinion 
    
Q6 correct –0.127 –0.083 –0.021 
 (0.108) (0.137) (0.094) 
    
Observations 180 180 180 
Note: Observations are considered only of groups where all members evaluated all other members. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Thus, the demonstrability conditions three and four do not seem to have been fulfilled. 
Knowledgeable group members did not seem to be able to explain the reasoning for why E 
was the cost-minimizing alternative to the other group members or the other group members 
were not able to understand the reasoning. As a consequence, groups did not have an 
advantage and were not more likely to choose the investment level in line with the 
microeconomic choice rule, as shown in table 6. 
 
3.3. Subjects’ attention to information 
After making their choices in the experiment, subjects (individuals and groups) rated the 
importance of each information variable for their investment decision. Figure 4 illustrates how 
much attention individuals and groups attributed to the different information variables in the 
tax treatment. Except for the emissions performance variable, there was no significant 
difference in the weighting of the information variables between groups and individuals.9 For 
the performance standard treatment, illustrated in figure 5, there was no significant difference 
in the distribution of the importance of the different information variables between groups and 
individuals. Thus, overall there is no significant difference between groups and individuals in 
the importance attributed to the information variables. 
Figure 4. Stated relevance of information types in the tax treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0.0247 for emissions performance. 
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Figure 5. Stated relevance of information types in the performance standard treatment 
 
 
 
Within each treatment, the weight given to the four information variables can be analyzed, 
comparing each possible combination of variables with a two-sided t-test. The results are 
shown in table A.2 in the appendix. Starting with the tax treatment, we find that the 
information about the average cost of abatement is given a significantly higher weight than 
the other three remaining information parameters. This holds for individuals as well as groups 
in the tax treatment. Most interestingly, the information about the average cost of abatement is 
weighted higher than information on the marginal abatement cost, for both individual and 
group decisions. Looking at the influence of the stated relevance of information parameters on 
the actual investment decision, a multinominal logit model is run, and the results are shown in 
table A.3 in the appendix. Groups weighting the information about the average abatement cost 
high were also significantly more likely to choose the investment alternative with the lowest 
average abatement cost. For individuals, the point estimate is positive but not significantly 
different from zero.  
In contrast, in the performance standard treatment, the information about the emissions 
performance was ranked highest among all information parameters. As the results of the 
multinominal logit regression show (see table A.4 in the appendix), a higher-weighted 
relevance attributed to the emissions performance information leads to a significantly higher 
probability of choosing investment alternative E and significantly lower probabilities of 
choosing alternatives B–D.  
In summary, groups do not differ from individuals in the perception of the relevance of the 
information provided when making the investment decision. Most interestingly, in the tax 
treatment, groups do not identify the marginal cost information as the most relevant 
information attribute to a larger extent than individuals. In fact, the groups base their 
investment decision more so than individuals on the average cost of abatement. 
22 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study is related to that of Hennlock et al. (2017), who show that different policy regimes 
influence the investment choice of experienced managers, even though the different policy 
instruments are equally stringent. One potential objection to the validity of this finding is that 
firm managers rarely make investment decisions on their own. When the decision is made in a 
group, biases in decision-making might disappear, and the investment level chosen might no 
longer be dependent on the policy instrument.  
In this study, we do not find any evidence that groups are more likely than individuals to 
choose the investment level that is in line with a microeconomically founded choice rule 
under different policy instruments. In the performance standard treatment, in which there is an 
upper allowed limit of emissions, both individuals and groups to a large extent use a choice 
rule that minimizes the cost of the firm. Since this task is fairly straightforward, it is not too 
surprising that group behavior does not differ significantly from that of individuals.  
More surprisingly, this is also true for the tax treatment. We do not find a difference between 
the investment choices made by groups and individuals. What we can say from our analysis is 
that individuals who have knowledge about the optimization rule are significantly more likely 
to choose the investment level in line with the microeconomic choice rule. Since groups have 
the advantage of being composed of several individuals, we would expect that they would be 
more likely to identify the cost-minimizing investment alternative. However, this is not the 
case, and groups are not better than individuals at identifying marginal cost as the important 
information variable. Analysis of the group discussion shows that this seems to be because 
knowledgeable group members did not lead the discussion or try to explain the 
microeconomic foundation to the other group members. A potential reason for this behavior 
might be related to country-specific norms, as it can be argued that it is seen as socially 
inappropriate in Sweden to stand out as in individual in a discussion. However, such 
explanations are purely speculative, and future research should try to disentangle group 
discussions even further in order to get a better understanding of the mechanisms at play when 
investment decisions are made in groups. 
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Appendix 
A.1. Additional analysis 
Table A.1. Effect of taking a course in microeconomics on answering Q6 correctly.  
Probit Model  
Dependent 
variable 
Q6 (Yes = 1/No = 0) 
 Whole sample  Tax treatment 
only 
     
Microecomics taken 0.419*** 0.428***  0.423** 
 (0.120) (0.120)  (0.167) 
Age  –0.011  –0.003 
  (0.0137)  (0.0175) 
Constant –0.934*** –0.671**  –0.771* 
 (0.078) (0.328)  (0.418) 
Observations 565   565  282 
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Table A.2. Weight attributed to the information variables when making the investment decision  
 Mean 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Differences 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 EP TAIC MC AC  EP-TAIC EP-MC EP-AC TAIC-MC TAIC-AC MC-AC 
Tax treatment            
Individuals 3.55 3.77 4.11 4.61  –0.22 –0.55* –1.05*** –0.33 –0.84*** –0.50* 
 (1.65) (1.69) (1.56) (1.29)  (0.16) (0.29) (0.27) (0.31) (0.26) (0.25) 
Groups 2.94 3.84 3.92 4.78  –0.91*** –0.98*** –1.84*** –0.08 –0.94*** –0.86*** 
 (1.45) (1.42) (1.36) (1.34)  (0.21) (0.25) (0.30) (0.27) (0.27) (0.23) 
Performance standard treatment          
Individuals 4.99 4.06 3.53 3.96  0.93*** 1.46*** 1.03 0.54** 0.10 –0.44** 
 (1.46) (1.32) (1.61) (1.59)  (0.21) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.19) 
Groups 4.91 4.37 3.69 4.06  0.53** 1.22*** 0.85*** 0.68*** 0.31 –0.37 
 (1.37) (1.21) (1.41) (1.45)  (0.22) (0.26) (0.29) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
Note: In columns 5–10, pairwise two-sided t-tests are performed; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
 
26 
 
Table A.3. Tax treatment: predicted probabilities and average marginal effects  
Multinomial logit model       
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Tax treatment, individual 
Emissions performance  0.007 –0.043 0.011 0.033 –0.041* 0.054* 
 (0.011) (0.043) (0.036) (0.064) (0.024) (0.031) 
Total cost information 0.015 0.063 0.007 –0.087 –0.007 –0.012 
 (0.014) (0.042) (0.036) (0.064) (0.023) (0.013) 
Marginal cost information  –0.013 0.025 0.028 –0.154*** 0.066*** 0.027 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.031) (0.052) (0.024) (0.019) 
Average cost information –0.066 0.034 –0.019 0.033 –0.001 0.003 
 (0.045) (0.035) (0.030) (0.062) (0.016) (0.014) 
Predicted average  0.027 0.149*** 0.216*** 0.459*** 0.108*** 0.041* 
Probability (0.017) (0.041) (0.046) (0.052) (0.030) (0.021) 
Prob > chi2   0.004       
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Tax treatment, groups       
Emissions performance — 0.003 –0.081 0.128* –0.026 0.000* 
 — (0.012) (0.050) (0.072) (0.031) (0.000) 
Total cost information — 0.016 0.138*** –0.198*** –0.010 –0.000* 
 — (0.012) (0.040) (0.071) (0.012) (0.000) 
Marginal cost information  — –0.014 0.043 –0.080 0.047* 0.000** 
 — (0.012) (0.042) (0.063) (0.028) (0.000) 
Average cost information — –0.000 –0.108** 0.169** –0.027 –0.000* 
 — (0.009) (0.045) (0.073) (0.017) (0.000) 
Predicted average  — 0.031 0.375*** 0.531*** 0.047* 0.016*** 
Probability — (0.022) (0.054) (0.055) (0.025) (0.000) 
Prob > chi2   0.000       
Observations  64 64 64 64 64 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A.4. Performance treatment: predicted probabilities and average marginal effects 
Multinomial logit model       
Choice alternative A B C D E F 
Performance standard treatment, individual 
Emissions performance  0.004 –0.000** –0.052*** –0.134** 0.130*** 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.020) (0.066) (0.040) (0.017) 
Total cost information 0.005 0.000** 0.009 –0.020 0.023 –0.024 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.021) (0.043) (0.032) (0.016) 
Marginal cost information  0.017 0.000 0.008 0.079** –0.082*** 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.024) (0.038) (0.028) (0.018) 
Average cost information –0.014 0.000 0.011 –0.039 0.006 0.031* 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.027) (0.042) (0.035) (0.018) 
Predicted average  0.025 0.013*** 0.113*** 0.213*** 0.587*** 0.050** 
Probability (0.017) (0.000) (0.033) (0.041) (0.043) (0.023) 
Prob > chi2   0.000       
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Performance standard treatment, groups       
Emissions performance — –0.058*** –0.052*** –0.320** 0.203*** –0.021 
 — (0.019) (0.019) (0.145) (0.036) (0.022) 
Total cost information — 0.034* –0.011 –0.113 0.024 0.008 
 — (0.020) (0.023) (0.069) (0.026) (0.014) 
Marginal cost information  — 0.028 0.024 –0.079* –0.008 0.011 
 — (0.030) (0.032) (0.047) (0.024) (0.016) 
Average cost information — –0.026 –0.008 0.176*** –0.034* –0.014 
 — (0.038) (0.026) (0.055) (0.019) (0.014) 
Predicted average  — 0.077*** 0.108*** 0.262*** 0.508*** 0.046* 
Probability — (0.027) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039) (0.026) 
Prob > chi2   0.002       
Observations  65 65 65 65 65 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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A.2. Materials used in the experiment 
A.2.1. Experimental instructions (read out loud to all participants before the start of the 
experiment) 
Thanks for taking your time to take part in this research study. The objective of this research 
study is to better understand the effects of different policy instruments on the environmental 
investments of businesses.  
The project is financed by the governmental Foundation for Strategic Environmental Research 
(Mistra), which, among others, has the aims of creating strong research environments, solving 
environmental problems, and strengthening Swedish competitiveness.  
The study consists of two parts, 1 and 2. In part 1, you have to make an investment decision. 
The instructor will tell you when part 1 starts and ends. You will have 8 minutes to answer 
part 1.  
If you are a person who got an envelope on your own, you should make the decision on you 
own without discussing it with anybody else in the room. If you belong to a group you have 
received one envelope for the group, and you should make the decision together for the group. 
You are allowed to discuss with a low voice within the group.  
When you have finished with part 1, wait until the instructor tells you to open part 2.  
Part 2 consists of answering a survey. Even the persons who belonged to a group should fill in 
the survey individually on their own without discussing it with anyone in the room.  
After the end of the study, every person will get an amount that varies between 40 and 100 
Swedish crowns and that is determined by the total cost that the business has to bear as a 
consequence of the investment decision you have chosen in part 1. The higher the net revenue 
of the investment, the higher the amount you will get. Even the persons who belong to a group 
will get between 40 and 100 Swedish crowns per person, depending on the net revenue that 
the group decision generated for the business.  
If you want to be paid via Swish, you will be asked to write down your mobile phone number 
at the end of the survey in part 2.  
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You are anonymous. Your answer will be identified only by the number at the bottom of the 
answer sheet, and the final result will be presented on an aggregate level, without the 
possibility of connecting your answer to you as a person.  
The investment decision in part 1 is unique for every person or group, and we ask that you 
therefore focus on the decision that was assigned to you. 
A.2.2. Instructions for the investment decision10 
Below we will ask you to make an investment decision in your group. You can discuss within 
the group, but we ask that you speak quietly in order not to disturb the other groups.  
All investment decisions in the room are unique, and we ask that you therefore focus on the 
decision that was assigned specifically to you.  
Investment decision 
We would like to ask you to assume a situation in which you are part of making a decision 
about an environmental investment that a business will make in order to decrease its 
environmental impact from environmentally hazardous emissions. There are 6 investment 
options, each of which gives rise to specific emissions reductions. The table below shows the 
different investment alternatives, including the effects each investment has on the emissions 
of the business and investment costs.  
When making your decision, you should take into account that the company needs to pay an 
environmental tax equal to 250 SEK per kg each year for the emissions according to the table. 
An investment that reduces the emissions causes a yearly investment cost but also means that 
the company’s environmental tax expenses are reduced. The aim of the investment is to 
generate the highest net return to the company. 
Please indicate which investment alternative, Alt A to Alt F, you think the company should 
choose. All alternatives A to F have the same economic lifetime. 
 
Alt A Alt B Alt C Alt D Alt E Alt F 
Yearly average emissions 
(g/kWh) 
95 90 85 80 75 70 
Total annual investment cost 
(SEK) 
21 250 25 000 31 250 40 000 51 250 65 000 
                                                          
10 This was the version given to groups in the tax treatment. 
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Marginal cost for emissions 
reduction (SEK/kg) 
50 100 150 200 250 300 
Average cost for emissions 
reduction (SEK/kg) 
430 250 210 200 210 220 
  
 
Choose one of the following alternatives from the table above 
□ Alternative A 
□ Alternative B 
□ Alternative C 
□ Alternative D 
□ Alternative E 
□ Alternative F 
 
Indicate which information in the table was most important for you as a group in order 
to make a decision. Level 6 indicates very important information and level 1 very 
unimportant information.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Yearly average emissions (g/kWh)       
Total yearly investment cost (SEK)       
Marginal cost for emissions reduction (SEK/kg)       
Average cost for emissions reduction (SEK/kg)       
 
Please fold the paper and put it back in the white envelope when you are done!  
 
A.2.3. Postexperimental survey11 
There are a number of questions below that we ask you to answer individually. Thus, you should 
answer these without discussing with anybody else in the room. By answering these questions, 
you are also confirming that you have participated in the experiment.  
1. First, here are three statements about how you experienced the discussion in your group in 
part 1 of the experiment. Fill in how well you think the statements below coincide with your own 
experience: 
 
 Do not agree at all   Agree fully 
                                                          
11 This was the version handed out to groups; individuals only had to answer question 6 and onward. 
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 1 2 3 4 
I participated actively in 
the discussion. 
 
□ □ □ □ 
Everybody participated 
equally in the discussion.  
 
□ □ □ □ 
One person took a leading 
role in the discussion. 
 
□ □ □ □ 
2. Next, here are two questions about your collective decision in part 1 of the experiment. Fill in 
how well you think the statements below coincide with your own experience: 
 Do not agree at all   Agree fully 
 
 1 2 3 4 
I would have made the 
same decision as the 
group even if I were on my 
own.  
 
□ □ □ □ 
The discussion in the 
group changed my 
opinion. 
 
□ □ □ □ 
The group thought that 
the task to choose an 
investment level was 
difficult.  
 
□ □ □ □ 
3. Below are a couple of questions where we want to know how the members in your group 
influenced the discussion and your collective decision.  
First, here is a figure of how you were seated in the room. Indicate the place where you sat with an X. 
Indicate the other two members in your group with an A and a B in the figure.  
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Figure 
You and your group members’ placement: 
Whiteboard and desk (in front of the hall) 
 
□  □  □ 
4. Now, here are three statements about member A in your group (according to your own figure 
above). Indicate how well the statements coincide with your own experience:  
 Do not agree at all   Agree fully 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Member A had influence 
on our collective group 
decision. 
 
□ □ □ □ 
Member A had a leading 
role in the group.  
 
□ □ □ □ 
The group decision 
coincided with member 
A’s personal opinion.  
 
 
□ □ □ □ 
5. Next, here are three statements about member B in your group (according to your own figure 
above). Indicate how well the statements coincide with your own experience:  
 Do not agree at all   Agree fully 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Member B had influence 
on our collective group 
decision. 
 
□ □ □ □ 
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Member B had a leading 
role in the group.  
 
□ □ □ □ 
The group decision 
coincided with member 
B’s personal opinion.  
 
 
□ □ □ □ 
To sum up, here are a knowledge question and a couple of questions about your education and 
background. 
6. Indicate which of the following general statements yields the highest net revenue for a 
company:  
□ The company has chosen the investment with the lowest marginal cost in order to decrease the 
emissions.  
□ The company has chosen the investment that implies that the average cost to decrease the emissions 
is equally high as the environmental tax (crowns per kg) for the emissions. 
□ The company has chosen the investment that implies that the marginal cost to decrease the 
emissions is equally high as the environmental tax (crowns per kg) for the emissions. 
□ The company has chosen the investment that gives the lowest average cost in order to decrease the 
emissions.  
7. I have taken and finished courses at university level in: 
□ microeconomics 
□ environmental economics 
□ mathematics and physics 
8. How many finished (passed) university credits (uc) do you have in total if you would ask for a 
certificate from Ladok today?  
□ 0–15 uc 
□ 16–30 uc 
□ 31–45 uc 
□ 61–90 uc 
□ 91–120 uc 
□ >120 uc 
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□ 46–60 uc 
 
 
9. How large do you think your share of ”pass with distinction” grades is for the courses you 
have finished? 
□ 0–25% 
□ 26–50% 
□ 51–75% 
□ 76–100% 
 
10. In what year were you born? ____________ 
11. Sex: 
□ Female 
□ Male 
□ Do not want to report/other 
 
12. Specialization in your studies (if you are not sure, mark the specialization that you think you 
will specialize in): 
□ Economics 
□ Business 
□ Logistics 
□ Social science environmental program with specialization in economics (SMIL) 
□ Other 
 
13. How many of your group members did you know before?  
□ 0 
□ 1 
□ 2 
Thanks a lot for your participation! 
 
By participating in the experiment, you have earned 40 crowns, but depending on your answer in part 
1 of the experiment, you may have earned in total up to 100 crowns. We will willingly pay you via 
Swish if you indicate your mobile phone number on the line below (write clearly): 
 
My mobile phone number: 
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If you do not have access to or do not want to use Swish, you will be able to pick up your payment. If 
you choose this alternative, you have to tear off the voucher below on this page. Take the voucher with 
you for payment of the amount you have earned in the experiment. The payment will take place on the 
following days and times at the student expedition (economics and statistics) on level 5, E-house: 
February 1–3, 3 to 4 p.m.  
If you want to know more about the experiment and which investment level gave the highest net 
revenue, this information will be posted at the student expedition on level 5 in the E-house the first 
two weeks of February.  
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Figure A.1. Photo from the experimental session on January 18, 2016 
 
 
